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IN THE SUPRE11E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TED R. BROWN AND ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
CARNES CORPORATION, 
a:1d 
Defendant and 
Respondent, 
LONG DEMING TJTAH I INC. I 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court No. 15928 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLk~T 
Appeal from Judgments o= Third Judicial District Court 
.. 
in and for Salt Lake County, Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge, 
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and Judgment of Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge, 
Quashing Service of Summons on Defendant Carnes. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TED R. BROWN AND ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
CARNES CORPORATION, 
and 
Defendant and 
Respondent, 
LONG DEMING UTAH, INC. , 
Defendant. 
Supreme Court No. 15928 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
To this point, after five years of effort before the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in Salt Lake County, and 
before this court, it can still be said that the nature of this 
case is essentially the effort on the part of Ted R. Brown and 
Associates, Inc., Plaintiff and Appellant, to bring before the 
Jistrict Court of Salt Lake County, the Defendant Carnes Corpora-
tion for a trial on the merits of Brown's claim against Carnes. 
A detailed statement of the nature of the case appears in the 
3rief of the Appellant and is adopted herein by reference. This 
"e~l·· Bri~f is filed under and pursuant to the provisions of 
:Cc:l~ IS(;:,) (l) and (2). 
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DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The Third Judicial District Court, acting through 
Judge Gordon R. Hall, ruled that Carnes Corporation was not 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. Judge Peter F. 
Leary, before whom this matter was brought pursuant to order 
of the Honorable David B. Dee for an Evidentiary Hearing 
relating to the activities of the Defendant Carnes within the 
State of Utah and of its agents relative to the determination 
of whether or not Carnes would be subject to service of 
process under the Long Arm Statute in the State of Utah or 
whether i'c had an agent who might be served, refused to act 
~;iJence presented. His order stating he had r.c 
authority to overrule Judge Hall incorporated language in the 
order which would appear to invoke sanctions against t~ 
Appellant Brown. The Judge erroneously stated that "the 
evidence presented was peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
Plaintiff, obtainable by interrogation of witnesses, Youn; 
and Tregeagle, or by discovery prior to the hearing befcre 
Judge Hall on or about October l, 1974." (Order, 30th May, 
1978) Judge Leary specifically ruled that service upon the 
agents Richard B. McDowell and Lynn felton, officers 
respectively of Long Deming, Inc. and Utah Air Sales, was no: 
a service coming v1i thin the terms of Rule 4, URCP. The cour: 
quashed service by entering an Order to Dismiss. 
-2-
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NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEA~ 
Appellant seeks to have the Order of Gordon R. Hall 
and the Order of Peter F. Leary, dismissing the Defendant 
Carnes from the case and quashing service of summons, 
reversed and vacated. Appellant seeks to have this Court 
recognize the sufficiency of service of Summons upon the 
Defendant Carnes and the jurisdiction of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County over the Defendant Carnes and to have the 
matter returned to the District Court for a trial upon the 
merits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPEAL IS NOT PREMATURE AND IS PROPER-UNDER THE RU1ES. 
By the terms of Rule 75(p) (2), it is required that 
"the Reply Brief, if any shall be limited to answering any 
new matters set forth in Respondent's Brief, and shall con-
form generally to the requirements of other Briefs." Since 
Appellant has briefed, and set forth before this Court in its 
-3-
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brief, the basic and underlying arguments of the Appellant in 
connection with this matter, it does not seek to reiterate or 
withdraw attention from those arguments. The position taken 
by the Respondent Carnes in its Brief filed before this Court 
March 29, 1979 in its Point I, wherein it asserts: 
"The appeal is premature since the 
District Court's Orders are not final 
and immediately appealable." 
is entirely new to the five years of litigation on the 
jursidiction of the Court over Carnes and bears reply. 
The essence of the argument set forth by Carnes in 
~-" 2:--:ef that the appeal is premature, is that since there 
are two Defendants, namely Carnes Corporation and Long Deming 
Utah, Inc., that under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civi: · 
Procedure, the decision denying the jursidiction over Carnes 
is not a final decision. Rule 54(b) states: 
"When more than one claim for 
relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
and/or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the 
entry of a final judgment as to one 
or more but fewer than all of the claims 
or parties only upon an express deter-
mination by the court that there is no 
just reason for delay and upon an express 
-4-
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direction for the entry of judgment. In 
absence of such determination and direc-
tion, any order or other form of decision, 
however, designated, which adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims or the rights 
and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as 
to any of the claims or parties, and the 
order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims 
and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties." 
This ingenious argument by Carnes based upon the 
rule quoted, would seek to impose upon the Appellant in this 
case, Ted. R. Brown and Associates, Inc., which is trying to 
establish the jurisdiction over Carnes, the duty, which 
Carnes claims exists before the judgment becomes final, of 
applying to the Court for an express determination that there 
is no just reason for a delay in the entry of judgment, and 
secondly that the Court expressly directs the entry of 
judgment. Manifestly, in this case if such a duty exists, it 
is a duty of Carnes, which seeks to treat the judgment as 
final and wishes to escape the jurisdiction of the Third 
Judicial District Court. 
A careful reading of the full text of the citations 
referred to by Carnes in its Respondent's Brief taken from 
t·!oore's Federal Practice 54.27[6], 2nd Edition 1978, leaves 
-5-
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no doubt but that the Federal District Court can, if it 30 
chooses, go forward with the trial of the cause with the 
party who has had a partial determination of status or of ~e 
status of th€ claims against them still participating in the 
trial and reserving until the ultimate determination of the 
entire cause on its merits for appellate review the issue of 
jurisdiction. This method of procedure where appropriate, 
would save multiple appeals. Here, however, Carnes has 
treated the determination of the District Court quashing 
service of summons as a final judgment and has itself twice 
proceeded with appellate procedures without having previously 
~ver :-aised the issue which it now raises under Rule 54(b), 
Tne obJection now raised for the first time in this appeal is 
neither timely nor applicable to the legal and factual 
situation in this case. 
The fact is, that if jurisdiction of the District 
Court is not established over Carnes, there simply is no 
lawsuit. Clearly, since the only party benefited by entry of 
judgment quashing service of Summons is Carnes, if Rule 54(bl 
has any application to the situation, which appellant 
believes it does not have, then Carnes should have asked the 
Court to enter the judgment as a final judgment and find tha: 
-6-
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no cause for delay exists. Certainly, this is not the 
function of the Appellant, Ted R. Brown and Associates, 
Inc., in this case. Respondent cannot by its own failure to 
comply with Rule 54(b), insulate itself from timely appeal. 
Appellant further submits that an analysis of the 
actual position of the litigants in this matter discloses 
that the Complaint of Ted R. Brown is not based solely on a 
joint claim against the two defendants to the action. The 
First Claim and Second Claim of the Complaint are claims 
solely against Carnes and are based upon breach of contract. 
The second claim also contains an additional factor, namely 
an admission by Carnes that it was in fact indebted to the 
Plaintiff under the contract forming the basis for the first 
claim between the parties. Only the third claim sets forth 
any claim against both defendants Carnes and Long Deming. It 
alleges that a wrongful cancellation of the contract was 
accomplished by Carnes and Long Deming acting in concert. 
Carnes is an essential party to the litigation in all claims 
in the Complaint. Undoubtedly, Carnes could have elected to 
have treated the order of the District Court quashing service 
of Summons against it, as only a partial determination, 
answered the Plaintiff's Complaint, proceeded to trial on the 
-7-
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merits of the cause, and reserved the ultimate jurisdictional 
question for determination on appeal at the conclusion of ~e 
trial of the action on the merits. Carnes has refused to 
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court and elected to treat 
the order quashing service or dismissal as to Carnes as a 
final determination. Carnes has twice before brought appea~ 
before this Court treating the actions of the District Court, 
as final and determinative of the rights of the parties with 
respect to Carnes. In its brief on this appeal, it argues 
that the matter of jurisdiction has been finally determined· 
3.r1d :'..s res judicata. We direct the Court's attention to the 
fact that if Carnes is permitted to prevail based upon the 
argument contained in Point I, of respondent's brief, to the 
effect that the appeal now prosecuted by the Appellant Brown 
was premature, it makes a mockery of the entire Court 
procedure and leaves the Appellant Brown with no meaningful 
remedy which Brown can pursue. 
We note that Rule 72(b), U.C.A., gives to a partv 
the right to an Interlocutory Appeal when a party ~~ 
appeared specially and objected to jurisdiction and the 
objections have been overruled. No reference is there made 
to whether or not there are multiple parties involved in the 
action. 
-8-
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Secondly, the better view and the prevailing view 
today is that "An order sustaining a motion to quash or to 
set aside process or service thereof is appealable." This 
result has been justified on the ground that, 
" •.• such an order is in effect a 
final decision since further prose-
cution of the action is prevented thereby, 
or that the order comes within the 
purview of a statute authorizing an appeal 
from any order affecting a substantial 
right in a civil action or proceeding 
where that order, in effect, determines 
the action or proceeding and prevents a 
final judgment." 4 Am Jur 2d Appeal-and 
~. Section 81, p.598. 
This view has been specifically adhered to in the State of 
Oklahoma. We refer to the case of Harder v;- Woodside, 165 
P.2d 841, which ruled that "An order quashing the summons and 
setting aside the service made upon the defendant is an 
appealable final order." 
The fact that the Respondent treats the order as 
final and is positive of its posture in the case is well 
illustrated by its previous appeals to this Court and in its 
Point II in the present Brief. 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN ITS POINT II DOES NOT PRGPERl" 
'C'H"ARACTERIZE OR RECOGNIZrl'~cnoN- 'l"A'irnlrbr Jrrim~ £EARf 
JUDGE LEARY- D~ NOT- DETERMnr THAT JUDGE HA[!'Ts- R9EING11Ii 
CORRECT. HE Mmmt.Y"liliFOSED -'to- Att; 
The novel aspect of the Respondent's Brief ~ 
connection with its Point II which requires reply by this 
Appellant is the interpretation placed upon the action taken 
by Judge Leary. Judge Leary made no finding or determination 
that Judge Hall had correctly decided the issue of 
jurisdiction. Judge Leary without ever having requested or 
suggested to counsel that the Appellant Brown should justify 
its actions in not having conducted prior discovery, ana 
without having sought to be informed on this matter or having 
3.2 cee"':ained the actual availability to Plaintiff-Appellant 
Brown of the information, declared: 
"substantially all of the evidence 
presented before this court was pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of the plain 
tiff, was obtainable by interrogation of 
the witnesses Young and Tregeagle, or by 
discovery prior to the hearing before 
Judge Hall on or about October 1, 
1974 •.. " (R355). 
This statement of Judge Leary is entirely withou' 
support in the record. It is a conclusionary finding pre· 
pared by counsel for Carnes, submit ted to Judge Leary anc 
which Judge Leary signed, but it is totally unsupported:: 
-10-
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the record. We again respectfully submit to this Court that 
Judge Leary was not, by the order of Judge David B. Dee, 
under which order he acted in this case, authorized or 
empowered to invoke sanctions against any party for what he 
individually may or may not have considered to be a diligent 
pursuit of discovery in the matter. Clearly, in all events, 
before he could invoke such sanctions, the Appellant Brown 
was entitled to notice and to be heard in regard thereto. No 
such opportunity was afforded to Brown. Carnes made no 
effort to present any such accusation to Judge Leary or to 
invoke before that Court procedures looking towards a review 
of whether or not the Appellant Brown was subject to sanc-
tions by reason of failure to earlier present the evidence in 
the lower court. An examination of the findings by Judge 
L.eary and the order based on said findings, makes it clear 
that Judge Leary did not pass upon the question of "Long Arm 
Jurisdiction" over Carnes. He ignored the mandate of the 
order of Judge Dee under which the hearing was held, that he 
should determine the factual issues of whether or not Carnes 
~ad conducted activities in the State of Utah which would 
SIJbject it to Long Arm Jurisdiction. The Respondent's 
assumption that Judge Leary concurred with Judge Hall, is not 
founded upon the action of the Court. Since counsel for 
-11-
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Carnes prepared the findings and the order signed by Judge 
Leary, it would have been simple enough to have included a 
finding to support that contention if, in fact, Judge Leary 
was so persuaded. The Judge did not so find and there is no 
such language incorporated in either findings or the order 
reasonably susceptible of such interpretation. 
We respectfully represent to this Court that the 
attempt by Respondent to distort the action taken by Judge 
Leary by characterizing it as a determination that Judge • 
:-!all's order was correct, cannot be supported from the 
GGNGI:;BSIGN 
Appellant Brown reiterates its Brief in support of 
the Appeal and the conclusions there expressed. Counsel for 
Carnes is persistent in attempting to avoid the jurisdiction 
of the District Court and a trial of the action upon the 
merits. We respectfully submit that the facts clearly sho'A 
that Carnes enjoyed all the fruits and benefits of doing 
business within the State of Utah. Ted R. Brown and 
Associates, Inc., a Utah corporation and taxpayer should not 
be deprived of its right to enforce the contractual obliga· 
-12-
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tion against Carnes that Carnes' activities within the State 
of Utah created. We request that this Court rule that the 
District Court has jurisdiction over Carnes and that the case 
be remanded to that Court for trial upon the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
T~;~ AND s:AT,. k ~7~~ 
___ £:h _;/ . / _____ _ 
- ~~~~~------
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant, Ted R. Brown and 
Associates, Inc. 
220 South 200 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Reid E. Lewis and Robert D. Merrill this _____ day of April, 
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! 
Received two copies of the foregoing Brief this d1, 
-l 
of April, 1979. 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
0. WOOD MOYLE III 
REID E. LEWIS 
Received two copies of the foregoing Brief this ____ 
ofApril, 1979. 
-----------=~~~----------------ROBERT D. :'1ERRILL 
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